University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Operations, Information and Decisions Papers

Wharton Faculty Research

5-2013

Insuring Future Climate Catastrophes
Howard Kunreuther
University of Pennsylvania

Erwann Michel-Kerjan
University of Pennsylvania

Nicola Ranger

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/oid_papers
Part of the Environmental Studies Commons, Insurance Commons, and the Other Life Sciences
Commons

Recommended Citation
Kunreuther, H., Michel-Kerjan, E., & Ranger, N. (2013). Insuring Future Climate Catastrophes. Climatic
Change, 118 (2), 339-354. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10584-012-0625-z

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/oid_papers/7
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

Insuring Future Climate Catastrophes
Abstract
The combined influences of a change in climate patterns and the increased concentration of property and
economic activity in hazard-prone areas has the potential of restricting the availability and affordability of
insurance. This paper evaluates the premiums that private insurers are likely to charge and their ability to
cover residential losses against hurricane risk in Florida as a function of (a) recent projections on future
hurricane activity in 2020 and 2040; (b) insurance market conditions (i.e., soft or hard market); (c) the
availability of reinsurance; and (d) the adoption of adaptation measures (i.e., implementation of physical
risk reduction measures to reduce wind damage to the structure and buildings). We find that uncertainties
in climate projections translate into a divergent picture for insurance in Florida. Under dynamic climate
models, the total price of insurance for Florida (assuming constant exposure) could increase significantly
by 2040, from $12.9 billion (in 1990) to $14.2 billion, under hard market conditions. Under lower bound
projections, premiums could decline to $9.4 billion by 2040. Taking a broader range of climate change
scenarios, including several statistical ones, prices could be between $4.7 and $32.1 billion by 2040. The
upper end of this range suggests that insurance could be unaffordable for many people in Florida. The
adoption of most recent building codes for all residences in the state could reduce by nearly half the
expected price of insurance so that even under high climate change scenarios, insurance premiums
would be lower than under the 1990 baseline climate scenario. Under a full adaptation scenario, if
insurers can obtain reinsurance, they will be able to cover 100 % of the loss if they allocated 10 % of their
surplus to cover a 100-year return hurricane, and 63 % and 55 % of losses from a 250-year hurricane in
2020 and 2040. Property-level adaptation and the maintenance of strong and competitive reinsurance
markets will thus be essential to maintain the affordability and availability of insurance in the new era of
catastrophe risk.
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Abstract
The combined influences of a change in climate patterns and the increased concentration of
property and economic activity in hazard-prone areas has the potential to threaten the availability
and affordability of insurance in some regions. This paper evaluates the premiums that private
insurers are likely to charge and their ability to cover residential losses against hurricane risk in
Florida as a function of (a) recent projections on future hurricane activity in 2020 and 2040; (b)
insurance market conditions (i.e., soft or hard market); (c) the availability of reinsurance; and (d)
the adoption of adaptation measures (i.e., implementation of physical risk reduction measures to
reduce wind damage to the structure and buildings).
For the residential portfolio the total price of insurance across Florida (pure premium with
no loading) is estimated at $9 billion in a soft market and $13 billion in a hard market for the 1990
baseline climate conditions. For the worst case climate scenario in a hard market with the present
design of Florida homes as of 2009 (current adaptation), the annual total price increases to $25
billion in 2020 and $32 billion in 2040. Adaptation measures can significantly reduce losses and
the total premium; for example, in a hard market, where all homes in Florida meet the current
building code (full adaptation), the total insurance premium would decrease from $13 to $6 billion
for the 1990 baseline. If insurers can access reinsurance they will be able to cover 100% of the loss
for a 100-year return hurricane, and 63% and 55% for a 250-year hurricane in 2020 and 2040
under a full adaptation scenario. Property-level adaptation and the maintenance of strong and
competitive reinsurance markets will thus be essential to maintain the affordability and availability
of insurance in the new era of catastrophe risk.

Keywords: Climate change, natural catastrophe risk, insurance, risk management, tropical
cyclones, hurricane damage

1

. Correspondence: kunreuther@wharton.upenn.edu and erwannmk@wharton.upenn.edu
phone: 215-898-5688
fax: 215-573-2130
2

Email: n.ranger@lse.ac.uk.

1

1. Introduction
Insurance is an important risk management tool; today the insurance
industry absorbs around 40% of catastrophe losses in the industrialized countries
(Hoeppe and Gurenko 2006). This paper explores the potential implications of
climate change for the availability and affordability of insurance in the world’s
largest insurance market, the USA, focusing on wind-related property insurance in
Florida. Specifically, the paper evaluates the implications of current and future
hurricane activity for the price of insurance and the ability of the private insurance
sector to provide coverage. We also evaluate the benefits of adaptation and
competitive reinsurance markets in helping to constrain prices and extend
insurance coverage.
Recent experience suggests that the world has already entered a new era of
catastrophe risk. Of the 25 most costly insured catastrophes worldwide between
1970 and 2010, fifteen have occurred since 2001. With the exception of the
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, all twenty-five of these catastrophes were
natural disasters. More than 80 percent of these were weather-related events with
nearly three-quarters of the claims in the United States (Kunreuther and MichelKerjan 2011). The observed increase in the costs of disasters results from several
parallel influences. These comprise rapid population growth, an increase in the
value at risk (e.g. more residences and infrastructure in hurricane-prone areas),
density of insurance coverage and the possible impact of global warming on the
frequency and severity of hurricanes.
The state of Florida, the focus of this study, provides an example of why
losses from natural disasters have increased so rapidly. Until recently the
economic impact of hurricanes was limited due to the sparseness of Florida’s
population; in 1950, the state ranked 20th in population in the U.S. with 2.8
million inhabitants. With the large influx of new residents, Florida was the fourth
most populous state in the U.S. in 2010 with 18.8 million people, nearly a 570
percent increase since 1950. It is estimated that, after correcting for inflation, the
damage from Hurricane Andrew, which hit Miami in 1992, would have been more
than twice as great if it had occurred in 2005 (Pielke et al. 2008).
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This increased exposure to hurricanes is not unique to Florida. As of
December 2007, Florida and the state of New York each had nearly $2.5 trillion in
insured property value located on the coast. The coastal insured value in the
United States for the top 10 states combined accounts for more than $8.3 trillion
(Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan 2011). If one adds what is covered against floodrelated damage by the National Flood Insurance Program, the insured property
value at risk would be augmented by $1 trillion. These figures only reflect the
insured portion of the total exposure. Such huge concentrations of value in highly
exposed areas indicates that any very strong hurricane that hits these regions is
likely to inflict hundreds of billion dollars of economic losses.
Cost-effective adaptation measures can play an important role in
constraining losses from hurricanes. An analysis of four states, Florida, New
York, South Carolina and Texas, reveals that if the latest building codes were
enforced on all residential homes, damage from hurricanes would be reduced
significantly. For example, losses from a hurricane with a 500-year return period
hitting Florida would be reduced by more than 50 percent if all residential
structures met the requirements defined by the Institute for Business and Home
Safety (Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan 2011). However, despite its experience
with natural catastrophes and adequate resources to prepare for them, the United
States still has inadequate loss-reduction measures in place to deal with largescale natural disasters Recent catastrophe losses and the failure of residents in
hazard-prone areas to invest in adaptation measures highlight the challenges of
reducing the impact of natural disasters (Bouwer et al. 2007; Cummins and Mahul
2009; Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan 2011).
The impact of manmade climate change on current and future risk is
somewhat uncertain. The debate on whether the series of major hurricanes that
affected the USA in 2004 and 2005 might be partially attributable to manmade
climate change is still ongoing. It is clear that 2005 was one of the warmest years
on record in the Atlantic Basin region (e.g., Knutson et al. 2010; Hegerl et al.
2007) and that higher ocean temperatures lead to an exponentially higher
evaporation rate in the atmosphere, which increases the intensity of cyclones and
precipitation. In the North Atlantic (Atlantic, Caribbean, Gulf of Mexico), the
total number of Category 4 and 5 hurricanes rose from sixteen in the period 19751989 to twenty-five in the period 1990-2004; however, the short length of high
3

quality data records mean that it is not currently possible to discern whether this
apparent trend is due to manmade climate change or part of a natural cycle.
Looking forward, Knutson et al. (2010) indicates that future projections
based on theory and high-resolution dynamical models consistently reveal that
globally, climate change will cause a shift in tropical storm intensities towards
stronger storms. But the study is also cautious, stressing that, for all cyclone
parameters, projected changes for individual basins show large variations between
different studies. For the Atlantic Basin, the majority of the studies reviewed by
Knutson et al. project, on average, an increase in storm intensity, although a
minority of individual models do project reductions. An increase in the number of
major hurricanes is likely to translate into a greater number hitting the coasts, thus
causing more severe damage to residences and commercial buildings in the
coming years. These future projections raise issues with respect to the insurability
of hurricane risk in hazard-prone areas.
To better understand the implications of future climate variability on the
affordability and availability of insurance in hazard-prone areas, this paper
address the following questions:






What prices will insurers/reinsurers charge to cover wind damage from
hurricanes in future years based on different climate scenarios under soft and
hard market assumptions
How much insurance protection (capacity) can the private sector provide against
losses from severe hurricanes with different return periods using different climate
scenarios
What will be the impact on insurance/reinsurance prices and availability of
coverage if all homeowners in Florida adopted adaptation measures (i.e.,
incorporated in the current statewide building code)?

2. The Price of Insurance under Different Climate
Scenarios
2.1. Scenarios for Hurricane Risk in Florida
Scenarios of future hurricane risk in Florida are taken from Ranger and
Niehörster (2011) (hereafter, RN2011). RN2011 uses a climate-catastrophe
modeling approach to generate a set of twenty-four scenarios based on the most
recent hazard projections from the scientific literature. Our analyses focus on two
4

of those scenarios from Bender et al. 2010 that reflect the upper and lower bound
hazard projections from recent dynamical model simulations. Bender et al. use a
technique known as dynamical-downscaling, which couples projections from a
global circulation model (GCM) to a high resolution regional model able to
simulate the characteristics of localized tropical storms. The two scenarios
presented here are based on the GFDL-CM2.1 and UKMO GCMs.3 We refer to
these as the high and low climate change scenarios, respectively. Further details
on the hazard scenarios are given in Online Resource A.
Some scientists have suggested that the range of outcomes predicted by
current dynamically-based models (e.g., Bender et al. 2010) may be too narrow.
For this reason, we also provide projections in Online Resource B for the upperbound and lower bound scenarios from RN2011 based on a statisticaldownscaling approach as discussed in Vecchi et al. (2008). For purposes of this
study, all scenarios should be treated with equal confidence.
These scenarios represent plausible long-term trends due to manmade
climate change. They do not account for annual variability in hurricanes due to
natural variations, such as the El Nino Southern Oscillation and the chaotic nature
of weather. Such natural variations would occur in addition to the trend due to
manmade climate change, meaning that losses in any particular year could be
above or below the trend in average annual loss. Bender et al. 2010 and RN2011
suggest that changes in storm activity driven by manmade climate change are
unlikely to exceed the range of this natural variability for at least a decade and
potentially several decades. This means that estimates of annual losses (and the
total insurance price) given in this study represent an average value over time
(here, a 5-year average). Accordingly, actual values in a single year may be
significantly above or below this value.
The outputs of RN2011 are exceedance probability (EP) 4 curves for each
hazard scenario. Projections are given for 5-year time slices centered on 2020 and
2040. These EP curves use proprietary loss information provided by the modeling
company Risk Management Solutions, Inc. (RMS) for a synthetic portfolio
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The climate model names are the names of the institutions that built them. GFDL-CM2.1 was
built by the Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory. Climate Model 2.1 UKMO was built by the
United Kingdom Met Office.
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representing residential property in Florida. Here, we treat this as a single
insurance portfolio. The portfolio (named the “Hybrid Exposure Set”) is defined
in Risk Management Solutions (RMS) (2010) and includes almost 5 million
residential buildings across Florida, with a total insured value of $2 trillion USD.
The portfolio represents residential exposure in Florida in 2009 and will be held
constant over time across all our simulations.

2.2. Pricing of Hurricane Insurance for the Studied Residential
Portfolio
We investigate the price of different layers of risk for the entire residential
property portfolio in Florida, where each layer represents a possible tranche of
insurance or reinsurance coverage. Utilizing the EP curves from RN2011, we
generated estimates of the Average Annual Loss (AAL) and standard deviations
(σ) of the AAL for wind-related hurricane risk5 for each layer of coverage under
the set of climate scenarios and two vulnerability conditions: Current Adaptation
and Full Adaptation. Current Adaptation characterizes the existing building code
status of homes in Florida (as of 2009). The Full Adaptation condition upgrades
all homes in Florida so they are in compliance with the Florida Building Code
2004. Given that most buildings in Florida were built prior to 2004 (eight-five
percent of the portfolio), this represents a significant upgrade in building
standards in their resistance to wind and would require a significant capital
investment to retrofit the existing residential building stock.
We assume that insurance is provided by one representative insurer and
that this insurer is behaving in the same manner as a reinsurer does by setting
prices for different layers of coverage. More specifically, consider a layer of
coverage (Δ) for wind damage from hurricanes in Florida (e.g., Δ= $5 billion to
$10 billion).
The price of insurance (PΔ) for this layer of coverage is determined by
calculating the average annual losses (AAL) in this layer and applying a given
loading factor to it. The loading represents the additional premiums the insurer
needs to charge to compensate for costs other than the expected loss (i.e., the
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An EP curve specifies the probability that a certain level of losses will be exceeded in a specific
location over a specified period of time (in this case, one year).
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marketing, brokerage, claims processing expenses, and taxes) while at the same
time ensuring that the coverage earns a high enough expected return on equity so
it is attractive so investors want to allocate some of their capital to this insurance
company.
The price also reflects the variance of the AAL since this determines the
amount of surplus6 that should be kept liquid to protect the insurer against the
possibility of insolvency or a significant catastrophe loss. As the variance of AAL
increases, the insurer will charge a higher price for a given portfolio or layer of
that portfolio to reflect the lower return that this portion of surplus can earn
because it must be easily accessible as cash should a catastrophic loss occur.
As discussed in Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2011), reinsurers often
determine the premium (PΔ) for a specific layer of coverage (Δ) that captures
these concerns by using the following formula:
PΔ = E(LΔ)(1 +λ) + c·σΔ

(1)

where E(LΔ) is the expected loss or AAL for the given layer Δ , λ is the loading
factor, σΔ is the standard deviation of a pre-specified portfolio of layer Δ and c
can be viewed as the degree of risk aversion of the (re)insurer. More specifically,
a lower value of c translates into more capacity being provided by the (re)insurer
for a given price, all things being equal.
LΔ reflects the loss distribution for layer Δ. The higher the value of σΔ, the
more the (re)insurer will want to charge for covering losses from layer Δ. A (re)insurer who is highly risk averse will specify a higher value of c reflecting its
concern with taking on any new book of business.
Of course the price a (re)insurer wants to charge depends on market
conditions. We first look at what is often referred as a “soft” market in the
insurance industry. Soft markets typically are characterized by new entrants into
the business, generous underwriting provisions, and aggressive discounting of
premiums to gain volume. Hard markets occur when insurers and reinsurers want
to charge a much higher price because they have suffered large losses from recent

5
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Storm surge losses are not included here.
By surplus we mean the difference between an insurer's assets and liabilities, i.e., its net worth.
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catastrophes and face a higher cost of capital to protect themselves against
catastrophic losses.
To reflect these two market conditions in our equation (1), we assume that
c = 0.4 in a soft market and c = 0.7 in a hard market. Six loss layers were
specified, using attachment and exhaustion points so that losses double from one
layer to the next (Figure 1); that is, $0 and $5 billion for Layer 0, $5 billion to $10
billion for Layer 1, $10 billion to $20 billion for Layer 2, $20 billion to $40
billion for Layer 3, $40 billion to $80 billion for Layer 4, and greater than $80
billion for Layer 5, the residual layer. With these defined layers, a loss model was
run to determine E(LΔ) and σΔ for each layer Δ.
Figure 1 depicts the return periods associated with the attachment and
exhaustion points for the Florida portfolio under the baseline climate conditions
(i.e., 1990), as well as the average annual loss and standard deviation for each
layer. For example, Layer 4 which covers insured losses from $40 billion to $80
billion (i.e., $40 billion in excess of $40 billion using (re-)insurance terminology)
has an attachment point with an annual probability of 1 in 40 and an exhaustion
point with annual probability of 1 in 145.
[FIG 1]

In this paper, we assume that there is no loading factor on the top of the pure
premium (i.e., λ = 0 in equation (1)) so PΔ = E(LΔ) + c·σΔ. 7 Tables 1a and 1b
summarize the price of insurance for (a) different layers under the two market
conditions (soft/hard market), (b) different years (1990, 2020, and 2040), and (c)
the low and high climate change projections, assuming current adaptation levels
for residences in Florida.8
[TABLE 1A]
[TABLE 1B]
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It is also possible to compute the ratio c·σΔ /(E(LΔ) to measure the effect of volatility on

reinsurance prices but this is outside the scope of this paper.
8

We assume that only one insurer provides coverage for the more than 5 million residencies in the
portfolio. Hence we cannot compare these results with what each insurer doing business in Florida
in 1990 was actually charging for its individual portfolio.
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Table 1 shows that there are important differences in the prices depending
on the condition of the insurance markets and the climate change scenario used to
generate losses in 2020 and 2040. For the baseline climate case of 1990, the
premium for all layers of coverage ranges from $9.3 billion (soft market) to $12.9
billion (hard market). When projecting future losses, the insurance price to cover
the portfolio falls by over 21% in 2020 and 27% in 2040 relative to the 1990 base
case for low climate change scenario, and are projected to rise by around 5% in
2020 and 10% in 2040 for the high climate change scenario. The worst-case and
best-case risk scenarios from RN2011 give an even broader range of possible
future prices (see supplementary materials for full data); from a baseline of $12.9
billion in 1990, to $4.7 to $24.2 billion in 2020 and $4.7 to $32.1 billion in 2040
under hard market conditions.

3. Impact of Adaptation on Insurance Price
This section examines the role that adaptation (i.e., implementation of
physical risk reduction measures to make buildings more resilient to wind) can
play in reducing the price of insurance. The adaptation measure we consider is the
adoption of a package of physical property-level resistance and resilience
measures consistent with the current Florida building code. We evaluated the
impact of Full Adaptation on wind-related losses from hurricanes by calculating
new EP curves based on proprietary information provided by Risk Management
Solutions. For this analysis, we utilize only the high and low climate change
scenarios.
Based on equation (1), Table 2 compares the price of insurance for the
Current Adaptation and Full Adaptation scenarios for a hard market where c = 0.7
for the two climate change scenarios. When all structures utilize adaptation
measures as specified in Florida’s building code for hurricane-prone areas (Full
Adaptation), the price of insurance falls significantly. For example, under baseline
climate conditions, the total price to cover all structures in Florida decreases from
$12.6 billion in the Current Adaptation scenario to $6 billion in the Full
Adaptation scenario. The change in price in 2020 and 2040 with climate change,
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with and without adaptation, is depicted graphically in Figure 2, where the arrows
represent the price difference with adaptation.
[TABLE 2]

We also look at events with specific return-period. Table 3 compares the
gross wind losses in Florida from hurricanes with return periods of 100, 250 and
500 years with current and full adaptation measures in place. The impact of Full
Adaptation is highly significant, cutting the loss by more than 50 percent for the
100-year return period, and by approximately 45 percent and 40 percent for the
250- and 500-year return period hurricanes, respectively.
[FIG 2]
[TABLE 3]

4. Ability of Insurers to Cover Losses with and
without Adaptation
This section examines the ability of the insurance industry to cover losses
from hurricanes. Specifically, we determine what fraction of losses from a 100year, 250-year and 500-year hurricane the private insurance market could cover in
scenarios with and without climate change and adaptation, and with available
reinsurance. To determine how much capacity insurers are willing to provide to
cover losses from such hurricanes in a competitive market, we follow the
methodology developed in Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2011) and outlined in
Online Resource B. We assume that each insurance group operating in Florida is
willing to risk 10 percent of its surplus to provide coverage for wind losses from
hurricanes that have a 100-year, 250-year or 500-year period. This 10 percent
figure was confirmed as a reasonable assumption for these analyses by the
insurers and rating agencies with whom we spoke. The total amount of coverage
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that insurers would have available to cover losses from hurricanes in Florida that
reflects 10% of their surplus would by $15.4 billion.9
We analyze the percentage of loss covered and the required surplus for full
coverage of the risk by the private insurance industry, under the assumption that
(a) insurers cannot purchase reinsurance (see results in Online Resource D, Fig S4
and S5) and (b) that they can purchase reinsurance to provide more hurricane risk
coverage. The methodology is described in the supplemental online material
along with a graphical representation of our findings with and without access to
reinsurance.
Table 4 focuses on the second assumption where insurers are provided
with reinsurance. The findings in Table 5 indicate that with the current status of
buildings in Florida (Current Adaptation) the insurance industry is not able to
cover a significant portion of the losses even for hurricanes with 100-year return
periods. Table 5 also indicates the significant impact that enforcement of building
codes and retrofitting of existing properties would have on the ability of insurers
to cover losses from these severe hurricanes (Full Adaptation).10 To see this, one
only has to look at the percentage of losses covered by insurers in the Current
Adaptation case. For example, with the high climate change scenario and Full
Adaptation, all structures will be insured for the 100-year hurricane in the year
2040 compared to only 62 percent in the Current Adaptation scenario. When
reinsurance is available and all homes meet current building codes, insurers are
able to cover all losses from hurricanes with 100-year return period and between
55 percent and 91 percent for hurricanes with 250-year return period as shown in
Table 5. This percentage of coverage is much larger than for the Current
Adaptation scenarios with reinsurance in place where insurers can cover between
32% and 50% of the losses from a hurricane with a 250-year return period.

9
In reality, of course, the determination by each insurer as to how much surplus it is willing to
assign to a specific risk (e.g., wind damage) in Florida depends on its financial characteristics
(assets, credit rating), the distribution of its portfolio for that risk and other risks in Florida as well
as other states and other countries, and how much state insurance regulators allow it to charge to
cover the risk
10
The current analysis only reflects the benefits of adaptation measures. Some of these measures

may not be cost-effective on existing structures but worthwhile undertaking when they are
integrated into the design of new construction as shown by Aerts and Botzen (2011a) and Jones,
Coulborne, Marshall, and Rogers (2006) for the design of buildings with respect to the flood risk.
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[TABLE 4]

5. Discussion
This paper constitutes a first attempt to systematically measure the
implications of future climate scenarios for the pricing of catastrophe risk
insurance, using the case of hurricane risk in the state of Florida, under various
conditions of adaptation and reinsurance availability. Without adaptation and
under a high climate change scenario, the price of insurance could increase
significantly with insurance then becoming unaffordable for many people in
Florida. Reinsurance and loss reduction measures can thus maintain the
availability and affordability of insurance in Florida, even under a worse-case
climate change scenario. Enforcing adaptation measures based on existing
building codes, as well as retrofitting existing properties, should enable insurers to
cover a much larger percentage of the losses in Florida.
Not only does adaptation significantly reduce the estimated price for any
given climate scenario, but it also substantially reduces the uncertainty in the price
of insurance. For example for a hard market in 2020 the range for the high and
low climate change scenarios under the Full Adaptation scenario (i.e., with all
buildings retrofitted to meet the Florida Building Code 2004) is $5-6 billion
compared to a premium range of $10-14 billion with the existing status of
buildings (Current Adaptation).
These results have important public policy implications given the recent
changes in the dynamics of insurance markets in Florida. In the aftermath of the
devastating 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons, primary insurers filed for rate
increases but only a portion of their requests were approved by the state insurance
regulator.11 This led many large insurers to significantly reduce the amount of
coverage they provided in hurricane-prone regions of the state. During this same
period, the state-run insurance company, Citizens Property Insurance Corporation,

11

There has been considerable tension in the past few years between the private insurance industry
and the state-run insurance regulator in Florida. Insurers want to increase premiums to reflect a
change in market conditions while the insurance regulator wishes to suppress premiums so as to
make the cost of insurance affordable.
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was permitted by the legislature to charge lower (subsidized) rates than many of
its private competitors, so that it became the largest provider of homeowners’
insurance in Florida.
According to the law, Citizens will be able to recoup any deficit it faces in
the aftermath of another major hurricane against its private competitors in Florida
(so-called post-event assessment). Those insurers will then have to levy this
amount against their own policyholders. This move from private insurance to
hybrid public insurance with post-disaster funding against the private sector
occurred because many residents on the coast felt that they were being charged
too much by private insurers after the hurricanes of 2004 and 2005. However, this
immediate benefit to the consumer may result in reduced societal resilience to
hurricane risk and greater impacts in the long-term. Kunreuther and MichelKerjan (2011) show quantitatively that following the 2004-2005 hurricane
seasons, Citizens did not have the necessary reserves to handle another series of
major hurricanes because its premiums were inadequate to cover the risks. While
Citizens has seen its reserves grow in the past few years due to the absence of
Florida hurricanes, its financial situation is unstable in the long term due to the
subsidized prices it charges for coverage. If there is an increase in hurricane
activity in Florida, Citizens financial situation will be even more precarious.
Future research could expand the scope of the analysis undertaken in this paper by
integrating other climate projections and incorporating the cost of adaptation
measures into the analysis. One could then undertake a meaningful benefit-cost
analysis under different annual discount rates and time horizons. The resulting
premium reductions provided by insurers to property owners could then be
compared with the costs of a multi-year loan designed to encourage investment in
these risk reduction measures. The Full Adaptation scenario, which represents
retrofitting eighty-five percent of properties so that they meet the Florida Building
Code 2004, is an extreme measure that will be costly to implement. Further
research should explore other options, such as retrofitting the highest risk homes
and strengthening codes in areas with the highest hurricane risk.
This study has explored only the impacts of climate change on losses. An
important (and much less uncertain) driver of losses in Florida is population
growth and the accumulation of assets in hurricane-prone areas. Projections of the
U.S. Census Bureau suggest that by 2020, the population of Florida could be more
13

than 20 percent higher than in 2010. If we assume that the spatial distribution of
exposure remains constant, this suggests that aggregate losses could increase by
an additional 20 percent higher in 2020 (and much more in some counties of the
state). Exposure is growing fastest in hurricane and flood prone locations in urban
areas on the coast. The effect of this trend on the availability and price of
insurance is an open question for further study.
Research is also required to explore approaches to enhance the uptake of
risk reduction measures. Our study demonstrates the considerable financial
benefits of adaptation, but empirical evidence reveals that many people do not
invest voluntarily in such measures even when they are cost effective. It is thus
important to appreciate the challenges in incentivizing individuals and enterprises
located in disaster-prone areas to invest in those measures and purchase adequate
levels of insurance coverage so as to reduce the need for government disaster
relief (Kunreuther, Meyer and Michel-Kerjan, in press). Jaffee et al. (2010) and
Michel-Kerjan and Kunreuther (2011) propose encouraging homeowners to invest
in cost-effective adaptation measures through multi-year insurance contracts.
These multi-year contracts would make the probability of a disaster occurring
during the length of the contract more salient and the benefits of adaptation
clearer.12

6. Conclusions
Recent state-of-the-art climate projections indicate the potential for an
increase in hurricane risk in Florida. This paper has attempted to systematically
measure the implications of such scenarios for the affordability and availability of
private insurance for homeowners. We focus our analyses on two scenarios that
represent an upper and lower bound based on current dynamically-based model
projections.
We find that the total price of insurance for Florida (assuming constant
exposure) could increase significantly by 2040, from $12.9 billion (in 1990) to
$14.2 billion, under hard market conditions. Under the lower bound projection,
premiums could decline to $9.4 billion by 2040. Taking a broader range of
12

See Aerts and Botzen (2011b) for an application of this concept to flood in the Netherlands.
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climate change scenarios, prices could be between $4.7 and $32.1 billion by 2040.
The upper end of this range could suggest that insurance becomes unaffordable
for many people in Florida. Adaptation significantly reduces losses and premiums
under all scenarios and extends the amount of coverage that could be provided by
the private insurance market. The implementation of loss reduction measures and
provision of reinsurance against catastrophic losses can increase the availability of
insurance in Florida and make it more affordability to residents of the state even
under a high loss climate change scenario.
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FIGURE LEGENDS
Fig 1 Loss Layers of the Florida Residential Portfolio for Different Return Periods (baseline 1990
climate conditions and current adaptation)

Fig 2 Change in Price of Insurance with Full Adaptation for the High and Low Climate Change
Scenarios

TABLES
Table 1a Price of Insurance under Low Climate Change Scenario

Low Estimate
1990

2020

2040

PRICE (SOFT) $
billion
PRICE (HARD) $
billion
PRICE (SOFT) $
billion
PRICE (HARD) $
billion
PRICE (SOFT) $
billion
PRICE (HARD) $
billion

Layer 0

Layer 1

Layer 2

Layer 3

Layer 4

Layer 5

0-4 yr

4-7 yr

7-14 yr

14-40 yr

40145yr

145yr
+

$9.3

$0.8

$1.4

$2.0

$2.7

$3.3

$4.3

$12.9

$1.0

$1.9

$2.9

$4.0

$5.2

$7.1

$7.3

$0.3

$0.9

$1.5

$2.2

$2.6

$3.9

$10.3

$0.4

$1.2

$2.1

$3.19

$4.1

$6.4

$6.6

$0.2

$0.7

$1.3

$1.9

$2.4

$3.7

$9.3

$0.3

$0.9

$1.8

$2.9

$3.7

$6.0

All
Layers

Table 1b Price of Insurance under High Climate Change Scenario

High Estimate
1990

PRICE (SOFT) $
billion
PRICE (HARD) $
billion

Layer 0

Layer 1

Layer 2

Layer 3

Layer 4

Layer 5

0-4 yr

4-7 yr

7-14 yr

14-40
yr

40145yr

145yr
+

$9.3

$0.8

$1.4

$2.0

$2.7

$3.3

$4.3

$12.9

$1.0

$1.9

$2.9

$4.0

$5.2

$7.1

All
Layers
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PRICE (SOFT) $
billion
PRICE (HARD) $
billion

2020

PRICE (SOFT) $
billion
PRICE (HARD) $
billion

2040

$9.8

$0.8

$1.5

$2.1

$2.9

$3.5

$4.5

$13.5

$1.1

$2.1

$3.1

$4.30

$5.5

$7.3

$10.3

$0.9

$1.7

$2.3

$3.1

$3.7

$4.6

$14.2

$1.2

$2.3

$3.3

$4.6

$5.8

$7.5

Table 2 Change in price of insurance over time under full adaptation for hard market

Year
1990
2020
2040

High Climate Change Scenario
Current Adaptation
Full Adaptation
$12.9 billion
$5.8 billion
$13.5 billion
$6.3 billion
$14.2 billion
$7.2 billion

Low Climate Change Scenario
Current Adaptation
Full Adaptation
$12.9 billion
$5.8 billion
$10.3 billion
$5.0 billion
$9.3 billion
$4.4 billion

Table 3 Effect of Full Adaptation on Hurricane Wind Losses ($ billions)
Adaptation case

1990

2020
High Climate
Change
Scenario

2040
High Climate
Change
Scenario

Return
period
(years)

All

Low Climate
Change
Scenario

Current Adaptation

100
250
500

$51
$80
$113

$44
$73
$107

$55
$88
$116

$36
$64
$92

$63
$100
$126

Full Adaptation

100
250
500

$24
$46
$68

$20
$39
$60

$27
$51
$72

$15
$35
$51

$34
$57
$78

Low Climate
Change
Scenario

Table 4 Percentage of loss covered and required surplus for full coverage by insurers with
reinsurance. Comparison of Current and Full Adaptation ($ billions)
Year

Scenario

Return
Period
(years)

Gross
Losses

Reinsurance
Coverage

Unreinsured
Losses

Percent of
Market
Covered

Gross
Losses

Full Adaptation

1990

Reinsurance
Coverage

Unreinsured
Losses

Percent of
Market
Covered

Current Adaptation

100

$24

$14.3

$9.4

100%

$51

$30.6

$20.1

76%

250

$46

$23.6

$22.1

70%

$80

$41.5

$38.8

40%

500

$68

$29.2

$38.6

40%

$113

$48.5

$64.0

24%
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High
Climate
Change
Scenario
2020
Low
Climate
Change
Scenario

High
Climate
Change
Scenario
2040
Low
Climate
Change
Scenario

100

$26.9

$16.2

$10.7

100%

$54.8

$33.1

$21.8

71%

250

$50.8

$26.2

$24.5

63%

$87.8

$45.4

$42.4

36%

500

$72.4

$31.2

$41.2

37%

$116.4

$50.2

$66.2

23%

100

$19.9

$12.0

$7.9

100%

$43.5

$26.3

$17.3

89%

250

$38.5

$19.9

$18.6

83%

$72.5

$37.5

$35.0

44%

500

$59.8

$25.8

$34.0

45%

$106.9

$46.1

$60.9

25%

100

$34.1

$20.6

$13.5

100%

$62.9

$37.9

$25.0

62%

250

$57.4

$29.7

$27.7

55%

$100.0

$51.7

$48.3

32%

500

$77.9

$33.6

$44.3

35%

$125.7

$54.2

$71.5

21%

100

$15.0

$9.1

$6.0

100%

$35.9

$21.7

$14.3

100%

250

$34.9

$18.0

$16.8

91%

$64.2

$33.2

$31.0

50%

500

$51.4

$22.2

$29.2

53%

$91.6

$39.5

$52.1

29%

Note: A graphical representation of these results along with those without reinsurance is
provided in Online Resource D
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